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Abstract 
The paper analyses the existing regulatory framework for the electricity and renewables sectors, and 
the role of regulatory agencies in Northern Africa and Middle East countries, under the promotion 
by the European Union. Using data collected through an original survey directed at regulators, 
ministry departments and energy companies of the southern Mediterranean, the study is aimed at 
assessing the extent of agencies’ independence looking at three main dimensions of independence: 
regulatory instruments available to regulators and decision making autonomy; regulators’ 
organizational autonomy; regulators accountability. Results show that those countries having 
established an independent regulator have a more credible regulatory framework than those 
countries in which such body does not exist. In particular, the analysis shows that Turkey, Croatia 
and Jordan have defined a regulatory framework that limits administrative expropriation and, 
consequently, creates an environment more suitable for attracting investments in the electricity and 
renewables sector. On the institutional ground, this is probably related with the harmonization of 
regulatory standards promoted by the European Union through the neighbouring policy, for the 
Jordan case, and the membership perspective, in the Turkish and Croatian case. 
 
 
Keywords: Independent Agencies; Investments; Mediterranean 
 
 
[Forthcoming Energy Policy 2013]
 2
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the extent of independence and decision making autonomy of energy 
regulatory agencies in the Mediterranean region. Institutional background of countries involved in 
this study would let scholars be sceptic on potentials for effective regulatory changes in the region. 
Nevertheless, a process of rules harmonization between the European and Northern African shores 
of the Mediterranean Sea seems emerging thanks to joint initiatives of cooperation on energy, 
renewables mainly, exploitation. Rules harmonization, one of the pilaster of Euro-Mediterranean 
cooperation, requires strong coordination among actors involved and make new organizations, such 
as regulatory agencies for the energy sector management, a relevant case study.  
The aim of this paper, thus, is not to define the better reforming model countries involved in this 
study have to adopt, rather to identify how current reform processes in a key sector such as energy  
may be shifted towards a more responsible development path. 
Being one of the features characterizing the process of liberalization (OECD, 2002)1, agencies’ 
independence from political power and stakeholders is widely recognised as a guarantee of 
regulatory commitments of a country (Majone, 1996; Gilardi, 2005a). With regards to the energy 
sector, the establishment of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) may favour investments in 
networks infrastructure and, considering the increasing relevance of renewable energy sources, 
facilitates system adaptation to the integration of intermittent renewable sources such as solar and 
wind.  
Regulatory agencies have been recently set-up in relevant energy producers and transit countries of 
the Mediterranean region, Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) countries mainly. The 
Mediterranean region, currently at the centre of renovating interests on electricity and renewables, 
is highly involved in European frameworks of cooperation, with energy rules convergence as one of 
                                                 
1 The OECD (2002) describes establishment of Independent regulatory agencies as “one of the most widespread 
institutions of modern regulatory governance”. 
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the main objectives to achieve.2 In the aftermath of current initiatives and investment projects, such 
as the Mediterranean Solar Plan and the Desertec, a harmonized and transparent regulatory 
framework at wider Mediterranean level is required. Thus, the progressive establishment of IRAs in 
the southern Mediterranean region is here analysed jointly with the degree of adoption of those 
regulatory standards qualifying the globalization of regulation (Levy and Spiller, 1994; Levi-Faur 
2005). Our study, which includes original data from IRAs in the Mediterranean region, mainly 
refers to findings from a survey launched on January 2012 among Mediterranean regulators and 
energy companies. Data have been collected from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, and 
Croatia. All respondents belongs to regulatory agencies with the exception of Morocco and Tunisia, 
where IRAs have not been set-up and answers have been provided respectively by the energy 
company, ONE, and the Ministry of Industry. Turkey and Croatia are currently candidate members 
to enter the European Union (EU) in next years and therefore they are already in the process of 
harmonizing their regulatory framework on energy sectors. These two countries then represent a 
useful benchmark on how rule harmonization from EU may affect the implementation of reforms by 
a non-EU country. Moreover, the analysis is completed with information drawn from official 
documents on Algeria, Israel and Lebanon. Libya and Syria have not been considered due to the 
unclear political situation, and civil war, at the moment in which the analysis started.  
Following a similar analysis for European countries (Larsen et al., 2006), our study is the first paper 
that aims at providing an assessment on the degree of independence of regulators in developing 
countries, providing new and original data - collected with a dedicate questionnaire to national 
regulators - on the extent of southern Mediterranean independence of energy regulatory bodies. 
With this regard, data organization follows three dimensions of agencies’ independence: decision 
making autonomy, organizational autonomy, and agencies’ accountability. Survey’s results show 
that regulatory agencies in the region are mainly advisory bodies of executives, the latter being the 
                                                 
2 The World Bank also played a leading role in promoting regulatory and competitive reforms, especially in both South 
America and Africa (Kessides, 2004). However, in recent years the EU pressure for rule harmonization is much more 
prevailing (Radaelli, 2003; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009). 
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sole having decision making powers on issues such as tariff setting and Third Party Access regime. 
Moreover, network unbundling in the region remains essentially functional, and state-owned 
companies own and manage networks in the majority of cases here considered. To sum-up, in 
MENA countries IRAs have been established before liberalizing the electricity sector but their 
degree of independence in regulatory decisions is still limited.   
The paper is structured into five sections: Section 2 critically reviews the rationale behind IRAs’ 
establishment. It analyse the model of IRAs as affirmed in the EU, being regulatory convergence in 
the Mediterranean region mainly promoted by the EU. Section 3 provides detailed description of 
our research method. Methods for data collection and assessment of the index of independency are 
described. The empirical analysis of IRAs in the mentioned countries is provided in Section 4. In 
Section 5 the study of regulatory harmonization in the electricity and renewables sector within the 
Mediterranean region is reported. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Rationale behind regulatory agencies’ independence 
 
2.1 Restructuring utility industries: the role of IRAs   
Introducing elements of competition in traditionally state-managed sectors, requires agencies’ 
independence being substantial in terms of agencies’ legitimacy, accountability, and capture risks 
(Larsen et al. 2005 and 2006). When regulators are “not independent” and regulation is carried on 
by Ministries or other governmental entities, the government can either directly force or indirectly 
influence the regulators to ex-post modify their decisions, thus constraining the regulators’ ability to 
commit to their regulatory policy. This lack of commitment leads to time-inconsistent decisions, 
undermining firms’ performance and investment incentives. Indeed, politicians are generally 
perceived as “bad regulators” (Stigler, 1971), since their intervention can generate uncertainty in the 
regulatory policy that in turn negatively affects firm’s decisions, especially in infrastructure 
investment.  
 5
The rationale behind the creation of an independent authority lies in the attempt to insulate 
regulators from political interference aimed at influencing regulated firms’ investment, employment 
decisions or price setting processes, particularly when the government has ownership stakes in the 
utility. IRAs institutional design have thus to assure: agencies’ independence, since the decision 
making point of view, from the Executive power; agencies’ accountability, in front of the elected 
bodies; and agencies’ autonomy, in terms of financial resources to be managed and expertise to be 
recruited in order to reduce capture risks and asymmetric information problems. Thus, the inception 
of truly independent agencies create a more stable regulatory environment and this in turn has a 
positive impact on the investment decisions of public utilities, both in Europe (Cambini and Rondi 
2011) and in Latin America and Caribbean countries (Gutierrez 2003; Andres et al. 2006; Correa et 
al 2006; Andres et al. 2007; Andres et al. 2008).  
The institutional context of the country has been assessed as the main influential factor when 
reforming the electricity sector (Levy and Spiller 1994; Gutierrez 2003; Zhang et al. 2006). As 
regards the energy sector, indeed, Cubbin and Stern (2006) show that, in those countries where an 
independent agency has been set-up, generation capacity has been improved, confirming the 
relation between performance of the utility sector and the governance of regulatory institutions. 
Nonetheless, Latin America shows cases of positive implementation of energy sector reforms such 
as the Chilean case where IRA was established in 1978 (Newbery 2001).3 Establishing IRA, thus, is 
part of sequences of steps in reforming utilities that firstly requires an institutional environment 
capable of limiting administrative discretion. Alternatively, established agencies may be seriously at 
risk of being captured.   
 
                                                 
3 Similar results have been found for the telecommunication industry. For example, Trillas and Montoya (2011) present 
an analysis of the evolution of telecoms regulatory independent agencies for 23 Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. Defining agencies’ independence in terms of regulators’ political vulnerability, the authors show that higher 
degree of authorities’ independence is associated with larger investment in infrastructure and a higher subscription by 
users.  
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In line with the experience of the US (Geradin 2004; Joskow 2007), the EU makes the 
establishment of IRAs at member countries level one of the pivotal element to the competitiveness 
of utilities. In Europe, the Great Britain was the first country to adopt IRAs (Saal 2002; Cambini et 
al. 2012). At EU level, the Directive 2003/54/EC carefully defined the institutional design of 
regulatory bodies, and provided a first framework for a pan-European coordination among 
regulators through the ERGEG - European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas set-up. Then, 
the Directive 2009/72/EC, part of a  third package of directives aimed at utilities liberalization and 
energy market integration, further stressed the role of agencies, their duties and the need for their 
effective independence; a strengthened coordination at EU level through the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), was affirmed. IRAs, thus, gradually emerge in the EU 
regulatory experience as the instrument pivotal to the electricity sector liberalization. Built on the 
EU domestic regulatory experience, the model of IRAs is the one the EU promotes in the 
Mediterranean neighbouring countries through partnership programmes and cooperation initiatives. 
Coherently with the literature mentioned in this section, the EU action has been directed at 
influencing those institutional factors that my affect utility reform projects. Thus, EU programmes 
have been directed at the state capacity building through the promotion of good governance and rule 
of law. Firstly the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995) and secondly the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (2004), foster sustainable economic growth and market integration at Euro-
Mediterranean level to be defined on shared regulatory standards mainly. The improvement of 
MENA rule of law and good governance is pursued through technical issues of cooperation, as in 
the case of the Mediterranean Solar Plan adopted within the Union for the Mediterranean initiative 
(2008). Being mainly based on promotion, and adoption, of regulatory standards, EU programmes 
favour a form of functional Euro-Mediterranean integration, which allow both to circumvent those 
“macro-political obstacles that have traditionally impeded the advancement of co-operation in the 
region” (Darbouche 2011, p.195), and improve countries’ transparency and rule of law. Thus, IRAs 
have to be viewed in the wider framework of EU rule of law and good governance promotion, being 
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a case of transparent regulatory practices of a country.  With this regard, the 2007 Euro-
Mediterranean Ministerial Conference provided, for the first time, the assessment of the regulatory 
framework for the electricity sector at MENA countries level, including the role of existing 
regulatory agencies, and the degree of diffusion of EU regulatory standards4. Moreover, the EU role 
as rules promoter was, although indirectly, assessed.  
Rules promotion may only partially explains the reasons behind spreading regulatory practices. 
Following the institutional economics literature, rules are implemented differently depending on 
countries’ institutional endowment (North 1990). With this regard, Levy and Spiller (1996) 
highlight how judiciary independency, functioning checks and balances system, veto players and 
contending social interests, as well as administrative capabilities of a country, are exogenous factors 
directly impacting on countries’ regulatory restraints and independence of regulatory agencies. The 
relevance of non-economic barriers and administrative capabilities to the implementation of specific 
policies, such as those for renewables, have been stressed with regards to EU Mediterranean 
countries too in comparison to northern ones (Lüthi 2010; Lüthi and Wüstenhagen, 2011). The 
second part of this section, thus, contains study’s assumption on explanatory factors for IRAs’ set-
up at MENA level and the potential impact of countries’ institutional endowment on independence 
of regulatory bodies.  
 
2.2 The establishment of IRAs: pitfalls of countries’ institutional endowment       
The rationale behind IRAs establishment are (Levy and Spiller, 1994): 
- the time inconsistency, and  
- the regulatory commitments/credibility issues. 
Electricity is one of the sectors in which time inconsistency problems arise in association with 
different and very often contending social interests. In democratic contexts, it is the legislative-
executive dynamic, as well as the alternation of parties in power, that reveals such contending 
                                                 
4 The 2007 Country Reports are available for Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey 
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interests. Delegating the rules’ implementation phase to technical agencies, thus, reduces the 
instability of the regulatory framework of a country that may be eventually associated to the 
possibility, for a government, of being replaced by other parties having different preferences, and 
representing different social interests. With regards to the majority of MENA countries, long lasting 
regimes show that such a “risk” of being replaced through democratic alternation of parties in 
power was almost absent for the past 20 years. Nonetheless, popular uprising throughout 2011 
revealed the high degree of vulnerability of consolidated authoritarian regimes. Lack of sufficient 
checks and balances between domestic institutions, strong power of incumbents, poor level of rule 
of law and good governance, and a bureaucracy largely dependent by the ruling élites, are those 
institutional factors characterizing MENA endowment. In such a context, the rational behind IRAs’ 
set-up may be viewed as strengthening incumbents’ regulatory discretion to the expenses of 
eventual opposition forces, and parties, in case of regime change. With this regard, the close 
relation between bureaucrats and incumbents makes government’s self-binding, through effective 
IRAs’ autonomy in decision making, less severe than expected. The close relation between 
bureaucrats and incumbents reinforces the capacity to infiltrate bureaucracy by élites in powers 
(Gilardi 2005a). Similarly, the lingering relation between incumbents and bureaucrats strengthen 
bureaucratic élites, making bureaucrats one of most relevant players in the region. Being MENA a 
public-driven economy mainly, bureaucrats are influent actors in those reforming processes that 
involve the utility sector too. To certain extent, bureaucrats may infiltrate elite in power, having 
developed that knowledge and technical expertise necessary for influencing the implementation of 
rules and reforming projects; they are those actors that may assure continuity in the sector’ 
management, and stability of the regulatory framework also in case of unexpected regimes change, 
such as the ones occurred during 2011-2012.  
The second reason behind IRAs’ set-up and independence is the regulatory 
commitments/credibility. Regulatory credibility is the sole insurance against the risk of 
administrative expropriation; when such credibility is lacking, it signals that political commitments 
 9
towards sector liberalization is missing, and the regulatory environment of the country is not 
transparent. The stability of authoritarian and monarchical regimes of the last 20 years has not been 
capable of generating new investments in the electricity directed at improving both cross-border and 
MENA – EU power exchanges, the latter being limited to the interconnection between Spain and 
Morocco (Medring 2010). As Levy and Spiller state (1994), the credibility of regulation in the 
utility sector is higher in countries in which executive and legislative discretions are reciprocally 
counterbalanced, than in countries where such counterbalance does not exist or is weak. Missing 
executive-legislative counterbalance, every form of regulatory intervention may be easily knocked 
over. In this case, administrative expropriation is a serious risk for foreign investors interested in 
obtaining a fair return to their investments. Considering the scenario of MENA countries, the 
functioning judiciary power remains the sole capable of assuring that degree of regulatory 
credibility for spurring new investments. The judiciary power, when independent, works as restraint 
to incumbents’ discretion. Thus, the highest is the degree of judiciary independence, the lowest is 
the regulatory commitment problem. In MENA region, such independence is undermined by poor 
resources available, arbitrary decisions on judges’ appointment and dismissal, as well as career 
improvements, and incumbents’ interference in the administration of justice when verdicts refer to 
regime opponents mainly (Freedom House 2011).     
 
3. IRAs in the Mediterranean region. The Survey method 
This study assumes countries’ institutional background, and political cleavages, as relevant for the 
definition of the country’s regulatory governance (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2006; Potrafke, 2010; 
Belloc and Nicita 2011). With this regard, in order to understand the extent of independence of 
regulators in the Mediterranean region, and the role played by countries’ institutional background, 
the dimensions of decision making autonomy, organizational autonomy, and accountability have 
been translated into a questionnaire. The survey has been directed at southern Mediterranean energy 
regulators and electricity companies. The objective of the survey is twofold: tackling the issue of 
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regulators’ independence in the Mediterranean region, and provide a measure of regulatory 
convergence in the area. The paragraphs that follow clarify data collection and assessment of 
independence index methods.  
 
3.1 The data collection  
Questions in the survey refer to standards for electricity sector liberalization mentioned in EU 
documents and plans for cooperation adopted since the 1996, when the Euro-Mediterranean energy 
partnership was launched in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean policy. The survey5 has been 
launched on January 2012 with the support of the Mediterranean Energy Observatory (OME), Paris. 
The text of the survey has been firstly tested by experts of the Florence School of Regulation at the 
European University Institute (EUI, Florence) and the Oxford Energy Institute. Then, invitations to 
take part to the study have been sent to energy companies and regulators members of the OME and 
the Association of Mediterranean Regulators for electricity and gas (MedReg). 
Moving from MedReg Institutional Group recommendations on minimum requirements necessary 
for assuring agencies’ independence (2008), and previous studies on the issue (Gilardi 2002; 2005 
a, b; Johannsen et al. 2004; Larsen et al. 2006), the survey includes questions referring to 
regulators’ competences, internal organization and budget, relation with the political power and 
stakeholders. It has been structured into an introductory section and 5 sections related to the 
electricity sector organization and the role of respondents’ organization. The introductory section 
(question 1 to 6) asks to define the organization whose respondents are referring to, distinguishing 
between national regulatory agencies (IRAs) and other bodies, such as offices, ministry’s 
departments, or companies responsible for the sector. Question on the year of IRA establishment, 
number of employees and agencies’ normative source (ordinary law, regulation, decree etc.), 
conclude the introductory part. The five sections on the electricity sector organization and the role 
of respondents’ organization,  have been organized as follows: 
                                                 
5 The survey is included in the Appendix to the paper and is available to the author upon request 
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- Section A Energy Sector Organization: Unbundling, Tariff setting mechanisms, the TPA 
regime and the role of regulators;  
- Section B Regulator’s competences having regards to Tariffs, License issue, Dispute 
settlement, Consumers’ protection;  
- Section C Energy Efficiency and Renewables, policies and regulators’ role; 
- Section D Regulator's Relations with Stakeholders, the political power mainly;  
- Section E Regulator's Internal Organization. 
 
The survey follows a standard methodology for capturing IRA independence. Usually, limits of the 
survey method adopted derives by focusing on formal aspects of independence, while substantial 
independence remains overlooked. The way our study overcome these criticalities is given by the 
sequence of information asked and the relevance given to decision making tools in the hands of 
regulators. Rather than laws and decrees establishing agencies, we look at the decision making 
process and regulatory tools having regards to specific aspects of regulation and related IRAs 
competences.  
   
3.2 Assessment of independence index 
One of the first papers on measuring agency independence was by Stern and Holder (1999). The 
work assess Asian agencies’ independence on the base of two variables: agencies’ institutional 
design, and informal aspects - processes and practices - of regulation. This study has been firstly 
considered due to the relevance of the substantial aspects of independence on formal ones. With the 
aim of enlightening processes and practices of regulation in the MENA region, as well as contribute 
to previous works on MENA energy regulatory framework, we adopted three main variables. These 
variables constitute the three dimensions under which IRAs independence has been measured. 
To this regard, our variables vary between 0, absence or very low degree of independence, and 1, 
presence of a fully independent agency. Binary variables have been adopted also in Gilardi (2002) 
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and Johannsen et al. (2004) seminal studies. These works mainly stress formal aspects of 
independence as well as difficulties related to a unique definition of independence. In order to take 
into consideration these limits, our study try to overcome criticalities applying a consolidated 
method of measuring agencies’ independence to a regional context, usually overlooked in terms of 
regulatory performance, through the identification of three dimensions of independence: decision 
making autonomy, organizational autonomy, and accountability. Arranged around these three main 
issues, question in the survey allow to investigate the extent of both formal and substantial 
independence while binary variables provide with a reasonable method of measuring agencies’ 
independence. Thus, in line with Hanretty and Koop (2009), agencies’ independence is here 
conceived in relative terms: each single issue for which the IRA is independent relatively 
contributes to the independence of the agency. 
 The index of agencies’ independence has been, then, defined as a simple average of the scores of 
the three dimensions of independence we consider. As in previous studies by Correa et al. (2006), 
Brown et al. (2006), and Andres et al. (2007), our analysis defines three sub-indexes for the 
assessment of both formal and substantial aspects of regulatory agencies’ independence. 
Specifically, as for Andres et al. (2007), decision making legitimacy, autonomy, and accountability 
of regulators are dimensions on the base of which regulatory performance in each country is 
measured and is considered in the sub-indexes definition. Answers are reported for each dimension 
of independence considered.  
Data referring to countries that have not established an IRA have not been considered in the index 
assessment. Data referring to countries and organizations that did not answer to the survey, but of 
which information are available in the literature have been considered for both index assessment 
and the description of the regulatory framework of the  electricity sector in order to provide for the 
organization of all available information for the entire region. The literature we refer to consists of 
Country Reports from the “Paving the way to the Mediterranean Solar Plan” initiative (2012) and 
the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Limassol (2007). The Presentation of Algerian 
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authority CREG, taken on May 2011 at European University Institute during the MedReg training 
seminar, is also considered. 
 
4. Dimensions of independence of regulatory agencies in the Mediterranean region 
With the aim of defining the current regulatory framework in the Mediterranean region, and 
harmonization with the EU system, the data here reported includes countries involved by the 
European Neighbourhood Policy – Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia - and 
countries candidate to the European membership – Turkey and Croatia6 - as benchmark for new 
reforming countries.  Table 1 reports data on organizations that participate to the survey, while table 
2 refers to data for those countries that did not reply to the questionnaire.  
 
 
 
Table 1 Survey Respondents 
Relation 
with the 
EU* 
Country 
Name 
IRA's Name Acronym Other 
Regulatory 
Body  
Acronym Sector Year  
set-up  
N. 
Employee
Normative 
source 
PC Egypt Egyptian 
Electric 
Utility and 
Consumer 
Protection 
Regulatory 
Agency  
EgyptER
A 
    Electricity 2001 70 Presidential 
Degree 
PC Jordan Electricity 
Regulatory 
Commission 
ERC     Electricity 2001 85 General 
Electricity 
Law No. 64, 
2002 
CC Turkey Energy 
Market 
Regulatory 
Authority 
EMRA     Electricity
Gas 
Oil  
LNG  
2001 467 Law no: 4628
CC Croatia Croatian 
Energy 
Regulatory 
Agency 
HERA     Electricity
Gas 
Thermal 
energy 
2005 57 Energy 
Activities 
Regulation 
Act 
PC Morocco     Office 
National 
d'Electricité 
ONE Electricity 1963 8705 Dahir 
                                                 
6 Croatia will be officially admitted to the EU by July 2013 
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PC Tunisia     Ministry of 
Industry - 
Directorate 
general of 
Energy 
MIN Electricity
Gas 
  20 Function of 
the ministry 
*NOTE: It refers to the relation with the EU. PC: partner countries involved in the cooperation programmes; CC: 
candidate countries to EU membership. 
 
 
Table 2 Missing survey respondents  
Relation 
with the 
EU* 
Missing 
cases 
MENA 
IRAs’ 
name 
Acronym Other 
Regulatory 
Body  
Acronym Sector Year 
set-up  
N. 
Employee 
Normative 
source 
PC Algeria Electricity 
and Gas 
Regulatory 
Commissio
n 
CREG     Electricity
Gas 
2002 50 Law N. 02-
01 February 
5, 2002 on 
electricity 
and the 
distribution 
of gas 
PC Israel Public 
Utility 
Authority 
PUA     Electricity 2003 30 Electricity 
law 2003  
PC Lebanon     Ministry of 
Energy and 
Water 
MEW Electricity
Gas 
     - 
*NOTE: It refers to the relation with the EU. PC: partner countries involved in the cooperation programmes; CC: 
candidate countries to EU membership. 
 
These data allow to make comparison and to identify the eventual rules convergence processes 
among some of the most interesting cases for the electricity sector organization and renewable 
energy policies throughout the Mediterranean.  
 
4.1 Decision making autonomy 
Data referring to independence of IRAs in the implementation of different regulatory tools are 
summarized in Table 3. The Table reports exclusive and/or shared competences having regards to 
sections A and B of the survey.  
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Table 3 Dimension 1 – IRAs Tools and Decision making autonomy 
† Network 
planning 
Year Competent 
Other body*
Tariff 
setting 
Competent 
Other 
Body* 
TPA year Competent 
Other body*
License 
issue 
Service 
quality
Disputes 
settlement
year Consumers’ 
protection 
Other 
body* 
year MEAN
** 
Egypt 0 - PC 0 CA 0.5 - - 1 - 1 2001 1 - 2001 0.50 
Jordan 1 2002 - 1  1 -  1 1 1 2002 1 - 2002 1.00 
Turkey 1 2002 - -  1 2002  1 1 1 2002 1 - 2002 0.86 
Croatia 1 2005  - CA 1 2006  1 0 1 2006 0.5 M 2006 0.64 
Tunisia 0 - PC - CA 0.5 2009 PC 0 0 1 - 1 - - - 
Morocco 0 - PC - CA 0 - PC 1 1 0 - 0.5 - - - 
Algeria†† 0 - PC - - 1 2002 - 1 1 1 2002 1 - 2002 0.71 
Israel†† 0 - PC 1 - 1 2003 - 1 1 1 2003 - - 2003 0.71 
Lebanon†† 0 - PC - -  - - 0.5 0.5  - 1 - - - 
† The table refers to agencies’ competences, 1=Full Competent,; 0.5= Shared Competencies or Consultative Role; 0=Not Competent; -= No Information  
†† Data available in the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Limassol (2007), Country Reports.  
 
*NOTE: it refers to other body having exclusive or shred competencies with the regulator. PC: Public company; CA: Central Administration; M: Ministry; NA= Information Not 
Available 
**NOTE: Average of the scores registered for the seven dimensions considered. The value is not calculated for Morocco, Tunisia and Lebanon for which IRAs are not existent. 
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As Table 3 shows, among MENA countries, only Jordan ERC may be defined as fully independent 
(at least from a formal point of view) under the first dimension here considered. Jordan’s authority 
is fully competent for those aspects identified as pivotal to sector’s liberalization: Unbundling, TPA 
and tariff setting. The other well performing agency is, to this stage of analysis, the Turkish one. 
The Turkish EMRA has, with the sole exception of tariffs’ definition, decision making powers on 
all regulatory issues given in the survey. For those Mediterranean countries for which an IRA does 
not exist, the electricity sector’s most sensitive aspects are co-managed by public companies and 
central administration apparatus. These results, may be considered a first confirmation of the 
relevance of central administration and executive power, as described in Section 2. It is the 
executive, indeed, that has decisional power with regards to regulatory aspects on which the 
effective independence and operational autonomy of a regulatory agency may be measured. Thus, 
when looking at those issues on which credible regulatory commitments and independence of 
regulators are measured in this study – unbundling, TPA and tariffs’ setting - we may conclude that 
IRAs in the Mediterranean area are not truly autonomous and independent in the decision process.7  
 
4.2 Regulators’ organizational autonomy  
The data available for the regulators’ internal organization and autonomy are reported in Table 4. 
Here we summarized findings from section E of the survey. This section has been organized 
following those organizational features “universally recommended” and fundamental in order to 
assure agencies’ independence (Johannsen et al. 2004; Larsen et al. 2006). It represents an 
opportunity to define the degree of independence of energy regulators looking at internal 
procedures for the organization of the work and its management within the organization.  
With regards to decisions on the regulators’ internal organization, this competence is shared 
between the regulator and the legislative power in the Egyptian and Jordan case; it is full 
                                                 
7 It is worth pointing out that even in countries that declare to have legal capability on price setting decisions, this does 
not implies that these regulators might not be influence by external (i.e. government) pressure. Our aim here is to define 
in which country the regulator has a formal independence in price setting, while the analysis on real independence is 
analysed with our sequence of sub-indexes. 
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competence of the regulator in the Croatian case. Turkish agency answers to the question 
generically and simply refers to the law as the normative source at the base of regulators’ internal 
organization; thus, it has not been possible to attribute any quantitative measures.  With regards to 
the personnel policy, it is a competence that the IRAs shares with the legislative power in the 
Egyptian, Jordan and Turkish case. Such as for decisions on the agency’s internal organization, in 
the Croatian case personnel policy is under the sole competence of the regulator. Looking at the 
organizational structure of the IRAs’ board, the model of Regulatory Council is the most selected 
one compared to the Single Head Regulator.  
In the study, Regulatory Council model is provided with higher scores than Single Head model, 
being convinced that a collegial board is more independent than a single chief, usually directly 
appointed by the executive head. Finally, with regards to IRAs budget, low scores are registered. 
Information on budget autonomy and approval describe one of the most important aspects of 
organizational autonomy of regulators: it provides knowledge of regulator’s potential for using 
resources independently from the political will, including the possibility to appoint experts and 
qualified human resources. The executive power is competent for the Regulator's budget definition 
and approval. The IRAs budget is generally defined for 1 year. 
The index we calculate shows the poor degree of autonomy of IRAs from southern Mediterranean 
countries. Croatia is the best performing, while Jordan is now ranked a 0.44 as Egypt and Turkey is 
only 0.31. As reported in Section 3 on index assessment, missing data for Israelian and Algerian 
authorities makes the assessment of the dimension 2 of agencies’ independence impossible.  
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Table 4 Dimension 2 -IRAs’ Organizational autonomy   
† Internal 
Organisation 
Competent 
Other Body  
Personnel 
Policy 
Competent 
Other Body  
Internal 
Structure
Competent 
Other Body 
Budget 
definition  
Competent 
Other Body 
Budget 
lag in 
years 
MEAN* 
Egypt 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 - Board of 
Directors 
0.5 Executive 1 0.44 
Jordan 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 - 0 Executive 1 0.44 
Turkey - - 0.5 0.5 0.75 - 1 - 1 0.31 
Croatia 1 - 1 - 0.75 - 0 Executive 1 0.69 
Tunisia 1 - 1 - - -  - 1 - 
Morocco 1 - 1 - 0.5 - 0.5 Executive 3 - 
Algeria†† - - - - 0.75 - 0 - - - 
Israel - - - - - - - - - - 
Lebanon - - - - - - - - - -  
† The table refers to Regulators’ internal organization and decision making autonomy. 1=Full competent; 0.5=Shared competences, Regulator and Legislative powers; 0= Not 
Competent at all, Executive power; -= No Information. Regulatory Council model Score=0.75; Single Head Regulator Score=0.5 
†† These data have been taken by CREG presentation (May 2011).  
*NOTE: Average of the four elements considered  
 
 
 
 4.3 Regulators’ relationship with the political power, and accountability measures 
Answers to questions on accountability provisions are summarized in Table 4. Section D of the 
survey is entirely dedicated to this dimension of independence. In this part of the study, we look at 
effective regulators’ independence from all those actors interested in limiting regulators’ actions. 
Such as for dimension 2 of independence, the assessment of the third dimension of independence 
for Israelian and Algerian agencies is impossible due to missing data. 
 
Table 5 Dimension 3 ‐ Accountability measures   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
† The table refers to Regulators’ relations with executive and legislative powers, and stakeholders. 
††Data available in Algerian CREG presentation (May 2011) and Israel Country Report from the Euro-Mediterranean 
Ministerial Conference, Limassol (2007)  
 
*NOTE: For countries choosing the “Independent” model we score this choice equal to 0.75 when IRA is not full 
competent for Unbundling, TPA and tariff setting. For countries choosing “Ministry” model we score this choice equal 
to 0 when IRA is not full competent for Unbundling, TPA and tariff setting (see Table 3) 
**NOTE: 0=Annual Reporting for Executive Approval; No obligations towards Legislative. 0.5= Annual Reporting for 
Executive Information; Annual Reporting for Legislative Information. 1= No obligations towards Executive;  
**** NOTE: Average of the four elements considered. 
 
The relation between regulators, on one side, and the political power and stakeholders, on the other 
side, is relevant considering the risk of a façade independence, such as in those cases when the 
regulator derives instructions from the executive power. Firstly, we asked respondents to identify, 
among the options provided, the model that characterizes relations between IRAs, the executive 
 † The Regulator, 
the Government 
and the 
Stakeholders* 
Appeal 
against 
Regulator's 
decisions: 
bodies 
involved 
Regulators' 
formal 
obligations 
towards the 
Executive ** 
Regulators' 
formal 
obligations 
towards the 
Legislative***
Mean**** 
Egypt 0 Courts 0 0 0.25 
Jordan 1 Courts 0.5 - 0.75 
Turkey 0.75 Courts 1 - 0.56 
Croatia 0.75 Courts 1 0.5 0.81 
Tunisia 0 Courts - - - 
Morocco 0 Executive 0 0 - 
Algeria†† 0 - - - - 
Israel†† 0.75 - - - - 
Lebanon - - - - - 
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power and the stakeholders. The options provided in the survey refer to three kind of relations: 
advisory, ministry, and independent model. 
In the first case no compulsory decision are taken by regulator, which is a sort of specialised 
councillor of the government. It is the government that has direct relation with stakeholders. In the 
ministry model, the regulator is an office, or department, within the executive. It has no autonomy, 
and cannot entail direct relations with stakeholders, except for those taken on behalf of the 
government or ministry. In the independent model, the regulator does not require approval from the 
executive power for taking decision on regulatory aspects and is autonomous in using regulatory 
tools, as those identified in the first dimension of independence. With the exception of Egypt, that 
chooses the ministry model, the other respondents selected the independent model. We controlled 
these answers with those provided under dimension 1 – regulatory competences. Considered the 
missing exclusive competences on unbundling, TPA and tariffs’ setting, we scored such a choice 
with 0.75 in the Turkish and Croatian case. All of them affirmed IRAs not having full competences 
on tariff setting, mainly. This adjustment allows controlling the coherence of answers provided.  
With regards to the role of the executive power in case of appeal against regulator’s decision, it 
should be stressed that Courts/Administrative tribunal is the option chosen by all IRAs respondents. 
The role of judiciary power is relevant in countries in which the sole limit to incumbents’ discretion 
is represented by an independent magistracy. With regards to MENA countries, as explained in 
Section 2, the independence of magistracy may be defined at risk of being undermined by groups in 
power, with the sole exception of Israel, Turkey and Jordan.  
Finally, the section closes with two questions related to obligations of the regulator in front of the 
executive and legislative powers. The answers to these questions directly assess are the 
accountability dimension of independence.  
Survey’s answers confirm low independence from the executive power in the EgyptERA case. The 
Egyptian agency has to submit an annual report to the executive for approval; while, there are no 
accountability provisions related to relations between the regulator and the legislative power. Jordan 
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ERC is not required to receive approval or to inform both the executive and the legislative of its 
work. Turkish EMRA need to inform both the executive and legislative powers; while Croatian 
HERA need to inform the executive power and submit an annual report for approval to the 
legislative power. The sub-index defined, thus, register very low values of independence for the 
Egyptian authority, while highest values are registered by Croatia and Jordan. 
 
4.4 Independence index  
As mentioned in the paragraph 3.2, a final index of independence is assessed as single average of 
the three sub-indexes defined. Table 6 reports the final data. On a scale from 0 to 1, none of the 
investigated agencies are graded with 1, full independent IRAs. Jordan and Croatia are among non-
EU countries, those better performing. In the Croatian case, being the country candidate to the EU 
membership, a direct influence of the EU can be identified. Such direct influence, we may 
conclude, works better than in the Turkish case. Jordan confirms to be an interesting case in terms 
of regulatory commitments. Although a monarchy with strong powers of the executive on the 
energy sector, Jordan is the sole case of IRA, within the southern Mediterranean, having decisional 
power on issues such as tariffs. Moreover, Courts may intervene in case of appeal against 
regulator’s decision, confirming the better functioning of the judiciary power as restraints to 
executive and regulators’ administrative discretion, than in other MENA countries. Thus, compared 
to the other southern Mediterranean countries having already established an IRA and taking part in 
the survey, Jordan is the most interesting case of regulatory agency conceived as insurance against 
administrative expropriations.   
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Table 6 Independence index 
 
† D1 D2 D3 Index 
Egypt 0.50 0.44 0.25 0.40 
Jordan 1.00 0.44 0.75 0.73 
Turkey 0.86 0.31 0.56 0.58 
Croatia 0.64 0.69 0.81 0.71 
Algeria 0.71 - - - 
Israel 0.71 - - - 
† The table reports the index of Independence of those regulatory agencies for the electricity sector that took part in the 
survey and for which data are available in the literature. The index is assessed as simple average of the scores registered 
for each of the three dimensions of independence investigated. 
 
 
5. Rules harmonization in the Mediterranean region: the electricity sector and renewables 
In this Section we analyse the electricity regulatory framework, as well as ad hoc provisions for 
renewables, resulting from the survey. Information have been reported also for those countries such 
as Algeria, Israel and Lebanon, that did not take part in the survey. The analysis here developed 
mainly refers to the section A and C of the survey, which investigates those aspects of the acquis 
communautaire on energy promoted through the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, and section E on 
renewables.  
In the first part of section A, question on managing networks, share of Independent Power Producer 
(IPP), TPA regime and transmission tariff system, have been included in order to understand how 
much it has been achieved in terms of sector liberalization and the creation of a safe environment 
for potential private, foreigners included, investors. Specifically, questions from 7 to 12, refers to 
sector’s unbundling; answers are summarised in Table 7.  
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Table 7 Electricity sector Unbundling and IPP system 
 Sector 
Unbundled 
IPP% IPP year Distribution 
Network 
Owner 
Network 
manager 
Egypt Y 10 - 19 2002 Public 
Comp. 
Public 
Comp. 
Jordan Y 20 - 29 2010 Gov. IRA 
Turkey Y 20 - 29 2003 Public 
Comp. 
Comp. 
Croatia Y 10 - 19 2004 Public 
Comp. 
Comp. 
Tunisia N 20 - 29 1996 Public 
Comp. 
Public 
Comp. 
Morocco N 40 - 49 1996 Local 
Admin. 
Public 
Comp. 
Algeria† Y 25  Public 
Comp. 
Public 
Comp. 
Israel† E 0.6-20 1996 Public 
Comp. 
Public 
Comp. 
Lebanon†† - - - Public 
Comp. 
Public 
Comp. 
† Data have been extracted from Country Reports delivered at the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, 
Limassol (2007), and more recent reports from the “Paving the way to the Mediterranean Solar Plan” initiative (2012) 
†† Data have been extracted from the Country Report released by the “Paving the way to the Mediterranean Solar Plan”  
initiative (2012) 
 
NOTE: Y= Yes; N= No; E= expected; 
Public Companies; Private Companies; Local Administration; Gov.=Government, Executive 
Comp.: Companies; IRA= the Regulatory agency 
 
The unbundling is one of the main aspects promoted at Euro-Mediterranean level in close relation 
with the adoption of incentive regulation and the definition of TPA regime. With this regard, all 
countries in which an IRA exists have unbundled the electricity sector or are expected to complete 
it, such as Israel, in the immediate future. The exceptions are by Morocco and Tunisia, among 
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survey’s respondents, and Lebanon, among non respondents; all of them have not established an 
IRA. The main characteristic of unbundling in MENA countries is the functional separation of 
generation, transport, and distribution activities, with the last two activities being under monopoly 
regime. Moreover, the coincidence between owner and manager of the networks, which are the 
state-owned companies, persists. Typically, state-owned, and vertically integrated, companies own 
and manage the distribution network, with the sole exception of Jordan; in this case the Government 
and the IRA manage the network.   
Table 7 reports different percentage of IPP per country with the year in which the system has been 
defined. The most critical situation is the Lebanese one, where a law for reforming the sector, 
launched in 2002, is in standby and a regulatory agency is missing. Egyptian low percentage of IPP 
is also recorded. Although the intention to allow new IPPs and implement renewables policies with 
a direct involvement of the regulatory agency competent for license issue, the situation seems now 
blocked by the political turmoil. The Moroccan case is the one obtaining highest percentage of 
IPPs. Contracts for energy production, with guarantee of purchase by the state-owned company 
ONE, have been concluded with companies Jorf Lasfar Energy Company (JLEC), Compagnie Wind 
of the Strait (CED) and Electric Power of Tahaddart (EET) (Paving the way for the Mediterranean 
Solar Plan - Moroccan Report, 2012). Nonetheless, the state-owned company ONE is the one 
allowed to buy energy produced confirming the model of Single Buyer. Tunisian and Jordan IPPs 
percentage are the same as for Turkey. IPP concessions are provided though a tender, both in the 
Tunisian case (with the state-owned company STEG as Single Buyer) and in Jordan. This situation 
is confirmed for energy generation from renewables too (Paving the way for the Mediterranean 
Solar Plan - Tunisian and Jordan Reports, 2012) 
The analysis proceeds with the study of the transmission tariff system and TPA regime. With 
regards to transmission tariffs, the survey asks to choose among the following options: cost plus/ 
rate of return (RoR), price cap (PC), and revenue cap (Vogelsang, 2002; Joskow, 2008). As Table 8 
shows, Egypt, Jordan, and Croatia selected, as current transmission tariff, the RoR; Turkey 
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indicated the revenue cap. Considering previous studies on the argument, Algeria adopts a cost of 
service mechanism, as well as Israel (European Commission 2007). Considering that respondents 
did not answered to the question on the tariff structure (question 14 in the Appendix I), the 
emerging scenario refers to the main literature on the argument.  
On the base of transmission tariff system indicated by our respondents we may argue that MENA 
regulatory framework for electricity generated from both conventional power plants and renewable 
sources has potentials for incentivising innovation and efficiency. RoR consists of defining a 
“normal profit or rate of return on the firm’s regulatory asset base after allowing for efficient 
capital and operating costs” (Parker 2002, p.501), implying a fix but certain profit margin allowed 
to the company. The price cap stimulates cost efficiency through the use of index of productivity 
change set for a specific regulatory period; such index is adjusted for changes in input prices, 
quality and efficiency targets imposed by the regulator. Letting costs and prices diverge during the 
regulatory lag, provides firms incentives to implement cost reducing investment and innovations 
(Egert, 2009; Cambini and Rondi, 2010). Both methods indicated by our respondents have their pro 
and cons. The RoR is criticised because of over-investments due to the fact that profit is set 
according to the size of the asset (Parker 2002). While, PC regulation, allowing revenues being 
divergent from costs during a pre-defined period of time, “can favour investment on innovation, at 
least in the short term”, but “does not promise specific long-term returns on investment” 
(Armstrong and Sappington 2006, p.341).. It is important to note that the decision to adopt one or 
another regulatory mechanism depends on the prevailing condition in terms of existing stock of 
investment and efficiency and quality goals. Our aim is not to assess if a country is adopting the 
better regulatory mechanism to its specific situation; instead, our analysis aims at providing 
evidence of which kind of regulatory mechanisms has been implemented and at inferring on the 
expected impact they might have on efficiency and investment incentives. 
Clear information on TPA criteria are missing. In this case, the authors are aware that having 
omitted answers’ options in the definition of the question results in lacking clarity of information 
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provided. Indeed, a specific TPA regime does not emerge and the role of regulatory agencies is not 
clear. With regards to the electricity trading, TPA regime when existent permits third parties’ access 
to the transmission network and the subsequent purchasing-selling of electricity at regulated or 
negotiated prices. The opposite is true when the Single Buyer model exists, and only one buyer 
buys electricity, usually at the lowest price, by producers and sells it to customers. Regulatory 
agencies’ role, under a TPA regime, is to set wholesale access regulated charges (Medreg 2010). 
TPA is maybe the most common element among MENA countries, and the most divergent one 
between MENA and European countries. While a regulated TPA regime is the most diffused form 
of TPA in EU countries, the MENA case is still characterized by the absence of such regime and of 
an effective energy market exchanges.  
As emerges from the survey, the tools available to regulators for guaranteeing TPA non-
discrimination and transparency are: template contracts to be followed by the utility companies in 
the Egyptian case; dispute resolution between companies and customers are also given. Licensing 
issue and legal provisions for TPA exist in the Jordan and Croatian cases. Algerian 2002 law 
provided for the introduction of TPA regime. although country studies of 2007 still affirmed that an 
effective regime still need to be defined. Finally, Tunisian’s regulatory framework, allows a generic 
TPA regime if these parties “satisfy  the conditions to access the network”; no further explanation 
are provided. 
 
 
Table 8 Tariff system and TPA regime 
  Transmission 
tariff 
Tariff, 
year 
Regulatory 
lag 
Tariff, 
previous 
system 
TPA criteria 
Egypt Cost 
plus/Rate of 
Return 
2010 1 Cost 
plus/Rate 
of 
Return 
Template 
contracts 
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Jordan Cost 
plus/Rate of 
Return 
  1   Licenses 
Turkey Revenue cap 2003 3   non-
discrimination 
Croatia Cost 
plus/Rate of 
Return 
2006 1 Cost 
plus/Rate 
of 
Return 
  
Tunisia Not 
applicable 
        
Morocco Not 
applicable 
        
Algeria† Cost of 
service 
      non-
discrimination 
Israel† Costs and 
fixed rate of 
return 
        
Lebanon           
† Data taken by Country Reports delivered at the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Limassol (2007). 
 
 
On the base of results from the study of IPP regime, transmission tariff system and TPA regime, we may  
affirm that there still high differences among countries considered but these differences are less 
sensitive in those cases having established a regulatory agency and that the more the agency is 
independent, the better the sector perform in terms of favouring access to of new producers electricity  
generation and transmission also from renewable sources. Jordan, thus, results the best performer and 
the country providing potential investors with security of limited risk for administrative expropriation. 
Current developments in the field of energy efficiency and renewable sources are also analysed. 
Both are pivotal considering the increasing energy demands from the southern Mediterranean 
countries and persisting energy dependency from European countries. The Mediterranean area has 
huge potentials for electricity from intermittent renewable sources; strong coordination between 
generators and distributors of the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea is, thus, required. 
Interconnections at south-south and north-south level raise the issue of defining a shared 
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institutional framework made up of common standards and rules. The section E of the survey refers 
to: regulators’ competences concerning energy efficiency and renewables, renewables priorities, 
constraints countries expect to find deploying renewables, their needs, and eventual programming 
instruments already defined or forthcoming. Table 9 provides a synthesis of organizations 
competent for energy efficiency and renewables.  
 
Table 9 Energy Efficiency and Renewables 
  Energy 
Efficiency 
(EE) 
Authority 
Year Renewables 
(RES) 
Authority 
Year EE 
Incentive 
system 
RES 
Incentives* 
RES 
Objectives 
(%) 
RES 
Objectives 
(year) 
Egypt ad hoc IRA   New and 
Renewable 
Energy 
Authority 
(NREA) 
1990   FIT;  TE     
Jordan Ministry   ERC   TE; Time 
based 
pricing; 
energy 
audits  
FIT; TE; TAX 11% to 15 
% 
2016 - 
2020 
Turkey Ministry 2007 EMRA   White 
certificates; 
energy 
audits 
FIT 26% to 
30% 
2021 - 
2025 
Croatia ad hoc IRA 2006 Ministry 2007   FIT 11% to 15 
% 
2016 - 
2020 
Tunisia Ministry   Ministry 2011   TE <10% 2010 - 
2015 
Morocco Ministry   Ministry 2009 Time based 
pricing 
FIT 16% to 
20% 
2016 - 
2020 
Algeria† Ministry    Renewable 
Energy 
Commissioner 
- Ministry 
  
  
FIT;FIP;TAX; 
Bank loans 
40% 2020 
Israel†         
  
FIP 10% 2020 
Lebanon†  Ministry - 
Lebanese 
Center for 
Energy 
Conservation 
   Ministry - 
Lebanese 
Center for 
Energy 
Conservation 
  
 
Bank loans 12% 2020 
*NOTE: Feed-in-tariff=FIT; Feed-in-Premiums=FIP; Tax Measures=Tax; Tender=TE; Green Certificates=GC 
† Data have been extracted from the Country Reports released by the “Paving the way to the Mediterranean Solar Plan” 
initiative (2012) 
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As shown in Table 9, energy efficiency and renewables are not the either exclusive nor shared 
competences of IRAs of the region with the exception of Jordan and Turkey. Ministries, and 
specific directorates within them, are mainly involved in the definition and implementation of 
energy efficiency and renewables policies. Maybe due to the very recent interests in the issue, 
renewables are widely managed by ministries and energy state-owned companies of the southern 
Mediterranean. The situation is different country by country; it goes from the missing legal 
framework in which the Lebanese sector develops (the 2002 law for the electricity sector, providing 
for the establishment of national IRA, has never been implemented and the organization working 
mainly as the regulator is the state-owned company Electricité Du Liban) to better defined 
situations, such as the one of Turkey and Jordan where national IRAs have specific competences in 
the sector. The lacking involvement of regulatory agencies in cases such as Algeria and Egypt, as 
well as the absence of a Moroccan IRA, raise doubts on the capacity to create a positive 
environment for investments in renewables generation and energy distribution for three of the 
countries more directly involved by European, public and private, projects.    
Moreover, the answers provided in the survey, as well as existing studies on MENA countries, 
clarifies the existing constraints to energy efficiency and renewables deployment countries have to 
face. The following have been indicated by the respondents as the most relevant constraints:  
- lack of financing due to high costs; 
- lack of investments due to low incentives; 
- unavailability of adequate technologies at reasonable prices. 
These constraints impede the developing of efficiency in electricity production and distribution. The 
high investment costs, the scarce availability of new technologies at accessible prices, may make 
efforts in promoting energy efficiency and renewables not easily to be remunerated. Eventually, 
incentive mechanisms provided have been analyzed. Incentive mechanisms indicated in the survey, 
are feed-in tariffs; taxation measures; green certificate; tender mechanisms. To improve energy 
efficiency, competitive tenders are used in the majority of cases, while Feed-in tariffs (FIT) is the 
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instrument mainly used for incentivise renewables. These mechanisms are still managed by the 
executive power. FIT, as well as Feed-in Premiums (FIP), consists of general purchase obligations 
at regulated prices granted to operators of renewable electricity plants for the electricity they feed 
into the grid. FIT, thus, are “preferential, technology specific and government regulated” 
(IEA/OECD 2008). While FIT is a total price per unit of electricity paid to the producers, FIP is a 
bonus additional to the electricity market price. Where present, as in the Israelian and Algerian 
cases, premiums introduce competition between producers in the electricity market. Usually, such 
tariffs should be defined for a period of 10-20 years in order to guarantee that degree of stability to 
investments decisions. Indeed, if on one hand, the tariff is regulated, providing a certain degree of 
security to investors, on the other hand, the FIT may be object of frequent amendments, 
undermining investors return and the credibility of the regulatory framework for the renewable 
policy. Thus, also for deploying renewables, countries regulatory culture and regulatory 
commitments matter.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we report the results from an original survey directed at the energy regulators of the 
southern Mediterranean area aiming at assessing the extent of regulatory agencies’ independence in 
such area. Results show that IRAs from the southern Mediterranean region have apparently full 
decisional autonomy and a certain degree of independence on issues such as consumers’ protection, 
dispute settlements and license issues. However, the data reveals also that tariff setting remain in 
the hand of executive powers limiting the effective decision making autonomy of IRAs.  
In cases such as Algeria and Egypt, the liberalization process mainly consists of functional 
unbundling: the public company separates into different branches (i.e. Algeria) or different 
companies for generation, transmission and distribution (i.e. Egypt) still under the government 
control. In these countries the regulatory agency is mainly an advisory body of the government, 
while it is state-owned energy companies that behave like the sector manager. Lebanon presents the 
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more critical situation restraining any project for IPP attraction and sector’s restructuring in a 
transparent way. The unclear legislative framework limits the deployment of initiatives for 
renewable and energy efficiency too, given the absence of a regulatory agency competent on 
licensing and eventually dispute settlement issues. On the contrary, among MENA countries, Jordan 
results the most promising both in terms of sector’s restructuring and deployment of projects in 
favour of renewable sources.  
Among countries in which IRAs do not exist, Morocco and Tunisia, two countries at the centre of 
international donors and private actors interested in deploying renewables, tend to preserve the 
dominant position of the state companies and limit potential new entrants.  
In our analysis, we consider also two Mediterranean countries interested by EU membership 
process. While for Croatia membership process is almost concluded, in the Turkish case this rests to 
be defined. Nonetheless both countries are under direct influence of the EU, the adoption of acquis 
communautaire being one of the pre-requisite for membership. The two countries confirm as the 
most interesting case, in terms of harmonization with EU standards, together with Jordan. These 
results, expected in the Turkish and Croatian cases, are quite new in the Jordan one.  
Our results also show that, consistently with the literature on the rationale behind the establishment 
of independent regulatory agencies, countries’ regulatory commitments are better defined and the 
sector better performing in those countries registering the highest degree of agencies’ independence 
than in those having poorly independent regulatory bodies. 
At a first look, the picture that emerge from our survey reveal limits of a regulatory framework that 
have to favour investment projects on renewables and energy efficiency, mainly considering the risk 
of not having a clear discipline for new IPPs accessing grid networks and the persisting model of 
Single Buyers (i.e. state-owned companies). At a closer look, indeed, our data also show potentials 
for future developments. Declared constraints such as the lack of infrastructure investments due to 
low incentives, in fact, reveal the need for both financial resources and technical assistance directed 
at the implementation of incentive measures. The mechanism directed at incentivise sector’s 
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efficiency and renewables is mainly feed in tariffs, a tool designed for accelerate investments on 
renewables technologies. In the end, both non-respondents and respondents to our survey, with the 
exception of Egypt, identify precise objectives in terms of percentage of energy to be produced by 
renewables in the immediate future and forecast the adoption of specific regulatory tools.  
Future developments of this study may be directed at assessing the influence that countries’ 
institutional background may have on the existing and future model of regulation, usually 
distinguished between market conforming and market controlling model. Finally, an assessment of 
risks of administrative expropriation may be provided in particular for those countries that are going 
to attract new investments on electricity generation from renewables but that maintains a vertically 
integrated system with a tariff discipline regulated by governments.  
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Appendix – Survey text 
1. What is the Organization you are referring to?  
Please select one of the two options:  
- National Regulation Authority for Energy NRA;  
- Other regulatory body responsible for Energy sector (i.e.: Ministry departments, Offices) OTHER BODY. 
 
2. Please indicate the name of this Organization. 
 
3. The Regulator you are referring to is responsible for: 
- Electricity 
- Gas 
- Electricity and Gas 
- Other, please specify 
 
4. In which year has the Regulator been established? 
 
5. Could you please type the number of employees? 
 
6. Please indicate the normative source that established the Regulator 
 
Section A: Energy Sector Organization  
7. Has the sector been unbundled (separated) into generation, transmission and commercialization? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Forthcoming, please specify the year 
 
8. Who is responsible for network planning approval and since when? 
- Public company 
- The Regulator 
- Ministry/Government 
- Other. 
 
9. Please specify the percentage of energy produced by Independent Power Producer (IPP) for 2010 
 
10. When the IPP system has been established? 
 
11. Who is the distribution network owner? 
- Public company 
- Ministry/Government 
- Local administrations 
- Other. 
 
12. Who is the distribution network manager? 
- The owner and the manager coincide  
- Other. 
 
13. Who is responsible for tariffs definition? 
- The Regulator  
- Public company 
- Public Authorities central administration  
- Public Authorities local administration  
- Other. 
 
14. Please indicate the tariff structure set by the regulator in a synthetic way (i.e. by using formula) 
 
15. Which is the transmission tariff mechanism adopted? 
- Cost plus/Rate of Return 
- Price Cap 
- Revenue Cap 
- Other. 
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16. Since when the chosen transmission tariff mechanism is applied? 
 
17. What is the regulatory lag (length of time between tariffs rate reviews)? 
 
18. Which was the previous tariff mechanism implemented?  
- Cost plus/Rate of Return 
- Price Cap 
- Revenue Cap 
- Other. 
 
19. Is the Regulator responsible for Third Party Access (TPA)? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Only consultative role 
- Sharing competences with other bodies, please specify 
 
20. Since when the Regulator is responsible for TPA? 
 
21. What kind of means the Regulator dispose for guaranteeing TPA non-discrimination 
and transparency? 
 
22. Can you please specify criteria provided by your legislation?  
 
Section B: Regulator competences  
 
23 Is the Regulator's competent for authorization procedures (i.e.: licensing the network access etc)? If yes, please type 
for which aspects he is competent and since when. 
 
24. Is the Regulator responsible of service quality regulation? If yes, please type for which aspects he is competent (i.e. 
transmission, generation etc) and since when?  
 
25. Is the Regulator in charge of dispute settlement (i.e.: between the authority and energy companies; between 
companies and their customers)? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Only consultative role 
- Sharing competences with other bodies, please specify 
 
26. Since when is the Regulator competent for disputes settlement? 
 
27. Is the Regulator competent for consumers' protection? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Only consultative role 
- Sharing competences with other bodies, please specify 
 
28. Since when is the Regulator in charge of consumers' protection? 
 
 
Section C: Energy Efficiency & Renewables  
 
29. Please indicate the institution in charge of energy efficiency 
 
30. Since when it is competent for energy efficiency? 
 
31. Which are the mechanisms the body competent of energy efficiency has adopted or is going to adopt in the next 
future? 
- tender mechanisms; 
- time based pricing; 
- white certificates markets; 
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- energy audits; 
- other. 
 
32. Which are the main constraints the body in charge of energy efficiency found or is expecting to find in 
implementing the above mentioned instruments? 
- lack of financing due to high costs 
- lack of investments due to low incentives 
- lack of private sector involvement 
- unavailability of adequate technologies at reasonable prices 
- lack of political involvement 
- lack of citizens’ involvement 
- lack of communication 
- other. 
 
33. Please type the name of the Body in charge of renewables 
 
34. Since when it is in charge of renewables? 
 
35. Is the body in charge of renewables competent in setting incentive policy? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Only consultative role 
- Sharing competences with other bodies, please specify 
 
36. Please identify the incentive mechanisms your country have defined for electricity production from Renewables 
- feed-in tariffs;  
- taxation measures;  
- green certificate;  
- tender mechanisms; 
- other. 
 
37. Which are the objectives to be achieved by your country in terms of electricity produced from Renewable sources? 
 
38. Which are the main priorities your National Renewable Energy Policy is based on? 
- Support to investments 
- Research and Development support 
- Price definition mechanisms 
- Improved Competition among Operators 
- Other criteria. 
 
39. Please type the name of the Policy or Programme for electricity production from Renewables you are referring to 
and the year of adoption? 
 
Section D: Regulator's Relations with Stakeholders  
40. How are the relations between the Regulator, the Government and the Stakeholders (i.e.: energy industry; 
consumers) defined? 
 
- The Regulator is an advisor of the Government. Final decisions are taken by the Government. NO DIRECT 
relation between Regulator and Stakeholders. 
- The ministry model: The Regulator is a body of the Government and has NO DIRECT relation with 
Stakeholders.  
- The independent model: The Regulator is separate by the Government. The Regulator has decision power and 
DIRECT relation with Stakeholders 
- Other. 
 
41. In case of appeal against Regulator's decisions, the following are involved: 
- Courts and /or administrative tribunal 
- Government Ministry of Energy 
- Parliament 
- Other. 
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42. Which are the formal obligations of the Regulator towards the Executive (the President, the Prime Minister and 
Ministries) Power? 
- Presentation of annual report for information only 
- None 
- Presentation of annual report for approval 
- Other. 
 
43. Which are the formal obligations of the Regulator towards Legislative (i.e.: the Parliament, or the Assembly) 
Power? 
- Presentation of annual report for information only 
- None 
- Presentation of annual report for approval 
- Other. 
 
Section E: Regulator's Internal Organization 
44. Who decides the Regulator internal organisation (internal procedures, allocation of responsibility, tasks etc)? 
- The regulator,  
- The Executive power,  
- The Legislative power,  
- Both regulator and executive,  
- Both regulator and legislative. 
- Other. 
 
45. Who is in charge of the Regulator personnel policy (recruitment, promotion, salaries)? 
- The regulator,  
- The Executive power,  
- The Legislative power,  
- Both regulator and executive,  
- Both regulator and legislative. 
- Other.  
 
 
46. Choose the option that better fits with the organizational structure of the Regulator 
- Single Head Regulator, one President plus Regulatory staff; 
- Regulatory Council Chairman plus Council members, and Regulatory Staff; 
- Other. 
 
47. Who is competent for the Regulator's budget definition and approval (i.e.: the government, the regulator)?  
 
48. For what duration of time the budget is defined? (i.e.: annual budget; multi annual budget, in this case please type 
the number of years).  
 
 
